1. This appeal is under Section 19 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention Act, 1987 (for short "TADA"). The three appellants were tried by the Designated Court at Ajmer for offence under TADA and after a long-drawn-out trial convicted them under Section 3(3) and also under Section 4(1) of TADA. Appellant Sukhchain Singh is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years under the two counts while appellant Jarnail Singh was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for four years on the first count and three years on the second count. Appellant Hakim Singh has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years on the first count and three years under second count. The Fourth accused Mit Singh was found not guilty of any offence and was acquitted.
2. The gist of the case against the appellants is the following:
They together pasted wall poster (on the night of 19.5.1987) on the wall of one Jugraj Singh's compound in Village Dhanor (Ganganagar District, Rajasthan). PW 16 Ram Pal, Station House Officer arrested the three appellants on 29.5.1987. On the strength of the information elicited from them copies of the wall posters were recovered from the places shown by them. They were charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences on completion of the investigation.
3. The prosecution examined 16 witnesses out of which a number of witnesses turned hostile. The defence also examined a number of witnesses. The appellants denied having participated in the activities alleged by the prosecution, when they were examined under Section 313 of the CrPC.
4. The Judge of the Designated Court, by a very lengthy judgment entered upon findings against the appellants on the disputed points and convicted them and sentenced them as aforesaid.
5. We heard Smt. Revathy Raghavan, Advocate (who was appointed as amicus curiae for the appellants) and Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, Standing Counsel for the State of Rajasthan at length.
6. During the course of arguments we entertained a doubt as to the very sustainability of the charge against the appellants for offences under Section 3(3) and Section 4(1) of TADA. It is admitted by the prosecution that none of the appellants was in possession of any weapon, much less any lethal weapon, specified in Section 3(1) of TADA. All the articles which the appellants were alleged to have possessed were wall posters and the other materials needed for pasting them on the walls. There is no case that they had even a small stick with them which could be used as a weapon. If that is so the prosecution cannot possibly make out a case of "terrorist act" falling within the purview of Section 3 of TADA. No terrorist act is contemplated without any of the weapons enumerated in the Sub-section. In view of the admission of the prosecution that the appellants did not possess any one of the weapons specified in the Sub-section, it is an exercise in futility to proceed further into any discussion on the evidence to find out whether the activities done by the appellants with the wall posters would amount to a "terrorist act".
7. The next aspect to be considered is, would the appellants have committed any "disruptive activity" falling within the purview of Section 4 of TADA? The expression "disruptive activity" has been defined in Section 4(2) of TADA. Such activity should involve questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or an activity intended towards the cession or secession of any part of India from the Union.
8. Shri Sushil Kumar Jain contended that as the wall posters contained the slogan "Khalistan Zindabad" an intention to question the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India could be presumed. Unfortunately, the prosecution has not led any evidence to show what is meant by the word "Khalistan" used in the wall posters. Could it have been a State within the Indian Union, or just a movement for that purpose or something more than that. Due to total paucity of evidence in that regard it is not possible to assume that the word is aimed unmistakably at creation of a separate country.
9. Learned Counsel made an endeavour to show that some other persons had, at some other point of time, tried to project that "Khalistan" as a new nation to be carved out of India. We are not disposed to reach any rash conclusion on such surmises or on the strength of some blabbering made by some irresponsible person at some other point of time. Until the word "Khalistan" used in the questioned wall posters is proved to be of that connotation, we are not prepared to read it into that expression. The prosecution should have adduced positive evidence at least to establish that what is meant by the word "Khalistan" in the wall posters was a disruptions slogan. The prosecution has not even attempted to do so.
10. In the result we have to hold that the prosecution did not succeed in proving that any of the appellants has committed any act falling within the purview of TADA. Therefore we are unable to sustain the conviction and sentence passed on them. Hence we allow this appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence passed on them and we acquit them. Bail bonds executed by them will stand discharged.