1.This appeal is preferred by the State of Maharashtra challenging the correctness and legality of the order of the High Court of Bombay dated July 9, 1992 restraining the appellant from executing the order of detention alleged to have been passed against the respondent under the provisions of the National Security Act. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant states that the period of detention fixed under the order was one year. Had the order been executed immediately after the passing of the said order, the period of the detention would have expired by this time. The question is whether this appeal deserves to be examined after a period of one and a half years since the passing of the order of detention. Under Section 3 of the National Security Act, the order of detention can be passed either by the Central Government or the State Government under two conditions, namely (1) that if either of the Government is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers of the security of India and (2) if satisfied with respect to any foreigner that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India.
2.Having regard to the object of the order to be passed, we feel at this time that too after one and a half years after the passing of the detention order even if the appeal is allowed, no purpose would be served by executing the order of detention though we are of the firm view that the High Court was not at all justified in entertaining such an application at a very premature stage before the execution of the order and preventing the appellant from executing the order. However, it is always open to the State if it is satisfied that either of the two conditions enumerated under Section 3(a) or (b) still prevailing, to pass an order.
3. With the above observation, the appeal is dismissed.
KRISHNABAI AND OTHERS V. RAGHUNATH NEMICHAND NAGAR AND OTHERS ORDER The controversy in this appeal needs to be dealt with in the backdrop of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The established fact situation is that the appellant was a tenant over certain lands which on the appointed day, i.e. on April 1, 1957, were in his possession. The statute permitted him to purchase those lands on payment of a concessional price, but he opted not to purchase them. Thereupon, under the compulsion of Section 32-P of the Act he let the landlord resume possession thereof. It is noteworthy that the tenant on his own volition can otherwise also end his tenancy and deliver possession of the tenanted land to his landlord by having recourse to the provisions of Section 15 of the Act. The landlord has also been given the right under Section 31 to terminate tenancy for personal cultivation and obtain possession. In that event he is statutorily bound to personally cultivate the area failing which right has been reserved in favour of the tenant to resume possession. Instantly we have a case in which the tenant by his conduct in not purchasing the area was compelled under the thrust of Section 32-P to let landlord take over possession. Such assumption of possession by the landlord was not and could not be saddled with any obligation to personally cultivate the area for it was not resumption under Section 31. Rather, as go the facts, the landlord transferred those lands by way of sale to Respondents 7 and 8. On this fact alone the tenant claimed that since his landlord had parted possession of the disputed land in favour of others that gave him the right to resume possession in assertion of his tenancy rights. On questioning, all the courts below found that the sale in favour of Respondents 7 and 8 was valid. If the sale was valid and beforehand the landlord had assumed possession under Section 32-P we see no reason to conclude that the holding was burdened with the obligation to accommodate the tenant on his landlord transferring possession thereof by way of sale. Section 37 employed by the appellant to seek restoration of possession 567 is of no assistance to him because it covers situations of termination of tenancy under Section 31, 33-B or Section 34 of the Act. As is obvious the landlord had got possession of the disputed lands under Section 32-P and not under Section 31. Section 37 on its terms is not applicable to the fact situation. Similarly on this understanding no aid can be sought from the provision of Section 84-C when the transfer has been held to be valid. From whatever angle the case is viewed the contention of the appellant lacks merit. The view taken by the High Court in the facts and circumstances appears to us to be unexceptional. Accordingly finding no merit in the appeal we dismiss the same. No costs.