1. Leave granted.
2. Heard counsel on both sides.
3. It appears that the appellant moved the Tehsildar for a declaration that she was the tenant of the land in question before its vesting in the State Government. The Tehsildar examined this contention and came to the conclusion that the appellant is a tenant in possession of the holding under an intermediary. The consequence of this finding under Section 8(1) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1978 (sic 1951) was that she had to be deemed to be a tenant of the State Government and was entitled to hold the land in the same rights and subject to the same restrictions and liabilities as under the intermediary immediately before the vesting. On the Tehsildar having found the appellant to be in possession of the holding in question as a tenant under an intermediary prior to the vesting of the estate in the State Government, she became entitled to the consequence arising out of the deeming fiction. When the Board constituted under the Act became aware of this order, it exercised power under Section 38-B, called for and examined the record of the proceedings in which the Tehsildar had taken the aforementioned decision and having found that the order was not legal and valid, interfered with the same. It is against that order that the appellant moved the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. The Full Bench of the High Court after considering the relevant provisions and in particular Section 8(1) of the Act read with Section 38-B, came to the conclusion that the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to revise the order of the Tehsildar since it was a mere administrative decision and was not a decision of a quasi-judicial nature. It, therefore, set aside the order of the Board to the extent the Board exercised power under Section 38-B and directed that the Tehsildar should reconsider the application on the administrative side and reach a decision on his own. Now that is precisely the objection on the basis of which the High Court proceeded to annul the order. If it had been an order made on the quasi-judicial side, the High Court would have held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction under Section 38-B and there would have been no occasion to interfere with the order. The High Court justified the Board's order to the extent it annulled the Tehsildar's order dated 17-12-1977 but interfered with it solely on the ground that the Board had no jurisdiction since the Tehsildar's order was not a quasi-judicial order. In other words, according to the High Court, the Tehsildar's order was an administrative order. If that be so, one fails to understand why the matter should be remitted to the Tehsildar once again to take an administrative decision? The order of the High Court is, therefore, unsustainable.
4. We set aside the order of the High Court and direct that the High Court should proceed to decide the matter on merits on the premise that the Board of Revenue had exercised the right of jurisdiction under Section 38-B of the Act. Having regard to the passage of time, we would request the High Court to give the matter priority and dispose it of.
5. The appeal is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.