1. A complaint was filed against the respondent-Company and two others who were Director and Assistant Manager of the said Company as officers-in-charge of the affairs of the said Company under Section 9(l)(i) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. During the pendency of the said trial, A-2 and A-3, viz., the said Director and Assistant Manager made an application for discharge on the ground that they were not liable for the offence punishable. During the pendency, on 28th October, 1989, the Trial Court discharged A-2 and A-3 for want of service of notice on them. The Company, in question, on 29-11-1989 filed an application before the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking for quashing of the proceedings against it on the ground that since Section 9(l)(i) of the Central Excise Act provides a mandatory punishment of imprisonment and there being no individual person before the Court representing the company, the proceedings against the said company cannot be maintained. The High Court accepted the said contention of the petitioner and quashed the proceedings against the said company. Being aggrieved of the said order of the High Court the complainant is in appeal before us.
2. It is contended that in view of Section 9(l)(i) of the Central Excises and Salt Act there is vicarious liability on the officers in-charge of the company who, if the company is found to be guilty, shall also deem to be guilty of the offences charged against the company, therefore, the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings. But on the facts of this case, that argument cannot be entertained because though these Director and Assistant Manager of the company were arrayed as accused persons in these very same proceedings along with the company the said two Director and Assistant Manager by virtue of the inaction of the complainant were discharged, therefore, they cannot now tried once again with the aid of Section 9(l)(i) of the Act. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent also contended that the offences in question was prior to coming into force Section 9(l)(i) of the Act which was on 27th December, 1988, therefore, even otherwise the complainant could not have relied on the said Section. It is not necessary for us to go into this question since the Director and Assistant Manager were once discharged and that discharge having become final they cannot be tried once again for the very same offence and in their absence company alone cannot be tried for an offence under Section 9(l)(i) of the Act. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. Therefore, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.