1. Leave granted.
2. Heard on merits.
3. A money decree was passed by the Calcutta High Court in favour of the United Bank of India, Respondent No. 1 against the appellant Amal KumarGhatakon 14-3-1986. It appears that an agreement was entered into between the appellant Amal Kumar Ghatak and respondent No. 3 Ms. S.N. Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. according to which the decretal amount was to be paid in the manner agreed therein by respondent No. 3. Other terms and conditions are unnecessary for this appeal. An ex parte Order was made by the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court appointing a receiver on 1-3-1991, in respect of the disputed property, in the proceedings for execution of that decree at the instance of Ms. S.N. Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., respondent No. 3, which had applied earlier for being added as a party even though the Order for its addition was made subsequently on 17-5-1991. After notice to the appellant, the learned single Judge confirmed that Order on 7-2-1992. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Division Bench which was dismissed by an Order dated 15-9-1992. These Orders have been challenged by special leave herein.
4. It may also be mentioned that on 18-3-1991 a separate suit has been filed by Ms. S.N. Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent No. 3) for specific performance of the aforesaid agreement made between the appellant and respondent No. 3. That suit is still pending. in the Calcutta High Court.
5. The grievance made on behalf of the appellant is that the property in respect of which the receiver has been appointed was not the subject-matter of the suit in which the money decree being executed was passed wherein the impugned Orders dated 1-3-1991 and 7-2-1992 by the learned single Judge and the Order dated 15-9-1992 by the Division Bench were made. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that under the garb of seeking directions for execution of the money decree, respondent No. 3 has obtained from the High Court Orders which relate to delivery of possession of the property which was outside the scope of the money suit, apart from being actually the subject-matter of the pending suit for specific performance filed by respondent No. 3 against the appellant. Learned Counsel submitted that in this manner, Orders have been made in execution of the money decree which were not only outside the scope of the execution proceeding of that decree but are within the scope of the pending suit for specific performance resulting in prejudice of the trial of the pending suit for specific performance. Reference was made to several observations made by the High Court which have a direct bearing in the suit for specific performance. On the other hand, learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 urged equally forcefully that this arrangement was brought about with the agreement of the appellant and in working out that arrangement, respondent No. 3, in addition to investing considerable amount of money in the property has also discharged to a great extent the liability of the appellant under the money decree to the bank. Learned Counsel submitted that the equity is entirely in favour of respondent No. 3 in addition to the fact that under the agreement between respondent No. 3 and the appellant, possession of the said property was handed over to the respondent No. 3 on 14-2-1986. However, the admitted position today is that it is the receiver appointed by the High Court, who is in actual possession of the said property.
6. In view of the conclusion reached by us and the direction we propose to make, we consider it unnecessary to deal with the above submissions at any length. It does appear to us that the Orders dated 1-3-1991 and 7-2-1992 passed by the learned single Judge at the instance of respondent No. 3, in the proceeding for execution of the money decree and the Order on appeal by the Division Bench made on 15-9-1992 are beyond the scope of the powers of the executing Court in the money decree. The appointment of the receiver of the property and the other directions related thereto cannot be treated as within the scope of that execution proceeding. It is also clear that such an action would be, in the present case, within the scope of the pending suit for specific performance filed by respondent No. 3 against the appellant, wherein no such Order has been sought as yet by respondent No. 3. It is, therefore, appropriate that these Orders made by the High Court are set aside and the parties are left free to approach the Court trying the suit for specific performance for such relief as any of them deem fit to seek therein. It is also made clear, in addition to the observations made by the High Court itself, that anything said by the High Court in the impugned Orders, which are hereby set aside, would not influence the decision of the suit for specific performance or any interlocutory Order made therein at the instance of any party to that suit.
7. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Orders dated 1-3-1991 and 7-2-1992 made by the learned single Judge and the Order dated 15-9-1992 made by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court are set side. The parties to the pending suit for specific performance are free to apply in that suit for any relief of an interlocutory nature as they may be advised to seek therein, and if that is done, the High Court will dispose of the application as expeditiously as possible. We also direct maintenance of status quo for a period of eight weeks in relation to possession of the said property, subject to any Order that may be made by the High Court in the pending suit for specific performance. The High Court will decide all matters relating to deposit or refund, if any, of the amounts deposited or spent by any of the parties. In the circumstances of the case, it is also expedient that the suit for specific performance pending in the High Court be heard and decided as expeditiously as possible. No costs.